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I. SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION: A NEW POST-ISSUANCE PROCEEDING TO 
REMEDY THE “PLAGUE” OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT OVER-PLEADING 
A unique aspect of patent litigation is that the prosecuting attorney often faces 
charges on par with the alleged infringer. Approximately one-third of all patent 
infringement lawsuits allege that the prosecuting attorney acted inequitably while 
obtaining a patent,1 putting both the patent at risk of being held unenforceable and 
the attorney at risk of losing his or her license to practice before the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or the Office). This is a scary proposition 
for the patent practitioner and patent owner, who could both be at risk of losing 
their livelihood. 
Congress recently enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 
introducing a new procedure that allows patent owners to, inter alia, preemptively 
reduce the likelihood of inequitable conduct claims during future litigation.2 
Statutorily, 35 U.S.C. § 257 provides a new post-issuance proceeding called 
supplemental examination, which allows a patent owner to remedy potential flaws 
accumulated in the course of prosecution of the patent application upon which the 
issued patent is based.3 Common flaws include prior art that was not cited and 
other information that was not adequately considered during prosecution. 
With this first-pass procedure, the patent owner submits the relevant 
information to the examiner for consideration in view of the existing patent 
claims. 4  If the examiner determines that no substantial new questions of 
patentability (SNQP) exist, the patent is “bulletproof” against inequitable conduct 
claims during future litigation.5 On the other hand, if the examiner believes an 
SNQP exists, ex parte reexamination is ordered to further analyze the 
information.6 If an SNQP exists, the statutory immunity with respect to the 
                     
1 Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable 
Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358 (2009) (highlighting table with column C showing 
fraction of district court patent infringement proceedings where inequitable conduct was pled 
reached forty percent of filings in 2007 and 2008). 
2 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
3 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 257 (West 2012). 
4 See id. § 257(a) (West 2012) (requesting that in a supplemental examination the Office 
“consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent.”). 
5 See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that a patent shall not be held unenforceable if the 
information was considered during supplemental examination). 
6 See id. § 257(b) (West 2012) (stating that if supplemental examination raises a SNQP, the 
Director shall order ex parte reexamination). 
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submitted information is still granted and the patent itself may be strengthened or 
weakened during the subsequent ex parte reexamination.7 
In early 2012, the USPTO proposed rules for supplemental examination, 
opening a public-comment period.8 After consideration, the USPTO responded to 
the comments and published final rules outlining the specific requirements and 
steps to supplemental examination.9 
This article begins with a discussion of inequitable conduct10 and follows with 
a summary of the supplemental examination rules and comments.11 Next, two 
major components of supplemental examination are discussed in depth. First, the 
USPTO’s reference to a recent Federal Circuit ruling12 to define “material fraud” 
is analyzed to provide specificity regarding its application in practice.13 Second, 
the supplemental examination rules are explored for potential holes where a 
practitioner could either cleanse a patent of actual inequitable conduct or create 
new grounds for inequitable conduct. 14  Finally, statutory amendments are 
proposed that could increase access to supplemental examination and reduce 
uncertainty.15 
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE 
Patents, by their very nature, affect the public by providing the owner with a 
legal monopoly on the invention. To increase the likelihood of granting patent 
protection to only novel, useful, and non-obvious inventions, the USPTO requires 
                     
7 See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that statutory immunity to inequitable conduct is 
only awarded “if the information was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental 
examination of the patent.”) (emphasis added). 
8  Changes to Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 3,666, 
3,678–81 (proposed Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/77fr3666.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
9 Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 
48,836–45, 48,851–53 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the 
AIA], available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,829 (defining 
“material fraud” as narrower than inequitable conduct in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & 
Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 See infra Part V. 
15 See infra Part VI. 
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applicants to disclose “all information material to patentability.”16 The underlying 
policy is that the applicant is in the best position to have full knowledge of the art 
and disclosure of this information leads to higher quality examination. 
In this section, the “duty of candor” is introduced with respect to inequitable 
conduct and the doctrine of “unclean hands.”17 Next, inequitable conduct is 
discussed as a litigation strategy, including how the perceived benefits have led to 
over-pleading and quantitative research supporting this view.18 Taken together, 
these trends provided the congressional motivation to enact supplemental 
examination.19  
A. Duty of Candor and Inequitable Conduct 
An inventor applying for a patent has a duty of candor and good faith in 
dealing with the USPTO, including the obligation to disclose all information 
material to patentability.20 Common “material” information includes references 
cited by a foreign patent office while prosecuting a counterpart application and 
statements regarding the patentability of the invention (e.g., arguments made to a 
foreign patent office).21 
The duty of candor applies to all parties associated with the filing and 
prosecution of a patent application, including the attorney or agent representing 
the inventor.22 Known as “Rule 56,” a failure to meet this obligation may23 result 
in an unenforceable patent if the breach exceeds the threshold of inequitable 
conduct.24  
                     
16 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (charging each individual associated with the patent with a duty 
of candor and good faith, including the duty to disclose all information material to patentability). 
17 See infra Part II.A. 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part II.C. 
20 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (stating that information is material if it is not cumulative to the 
record and either establishes a prima facie case of unpatentability or is inconsistent with an 
argument of patentability). 
21 See id. § 1.56(a)(1–2) (encouraging applicants to carefully examine prior art cited in search 
reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application). 
22 See id. § 1.56(c)(2) (charging “[e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the 
application” with the duty of candor and good faith). 
23 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(cautioning that because of the severity of punishment, inequitable conduct should only be applied 
if the penalty is commensurate with the violation). 
24 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“[A]n applicant’s misrepresentation or failure to meet his ‘duty to disclose’ . . . will not in itself 
render a patent invalid or unenforceable [but] . . . may be determined [under the appropriate 
standard].”). 
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Inequitable conduct refers to a legal principle “that is different from, but 
related to, the duty of disclosure.”25 The principle is rooted in the doctrine of 
“unclean hands,” where a patent owner seeking judicial enforcement of a patent is 
barred from remedies if the patent was obtained using disreputable means.26 
“Unclean hands” applies to applicants who, with the intent to mislead or deceive 
the examiner, withhold material information or submit materially false 
information to the USPTO during patent prosecution.27 These two elements—
intent to deceive and materiality of information—comprise the two-prong test for 
inequitable conduct. 
Successful inequitable conduct claims provide alleged infringers with the 
valid affirmative defense of unenforceability.28 This is the “atomic bomb” of 
patent litigation because it makes the patent valueless and even provides for 
recovery of attorney fees.29 Thus, failing to fulfill the duty of disclosure could 
spell devastation for the patent owner and his representatives, providing a 
windfall to any competitors. It is no wonder that pleading inequitable conduct is a 
key strategy in many patent litigation cases.30 
First, unenforceability applies not only to the accused claims, but the entire 
patent and potentially related patents in which the same information was 
withheld.31 Thus, one inequitable conduct claim could wipe out an entire patent 
portfolio. A second advantage to the party asserting the claim is that both the 
                     
25 R. Carl Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 257, 260 (1992) (referring to a common basis for inequitable conduct, 
“allegations that the patent owner acted unfairly in the prosecution of the patent.”). 
26 Mammen, supra note 1, at 1334 (“[A] patentee seeking to enforce its patent rights must not 
come before the court with unclean hands due to his intentional misleading of the PTO in order to 
obtain the patent.”); see also Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in 
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 49–50 (1993). 
27 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
28 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(1) (West 2012) (“The following shall be defenses in any action 
involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) . . . unenforceability.”). 
29 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(Rader, J., dissenting) (“The threat of inequitable conduct, with its ‘atomic bomb’ remedy of 
unenforceability, ensures that candor and truthfulness.”); see also Ningling Wang & Thomas L. 
Irving, Whither Therasense?, FINNEGAN (May 16, 2012), 
http://www.finnegan.com/FCWSite/abc.aspx?url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.finnegan.com%2fnews%
2fnewspdf.aspx%3fnews%3d08f8e827-0cee-4886-abb4-3e41ca27be99%26pdf%3dtrue (stating 
that alleged infringers will continue to assert inequitable conduct so long as the cost is minimal, 
the burden on the patentee is high, and the payoff is the “atomic bomb”). 
30 Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 337 (2011) (quoting Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall R. Rader 
characterizing the growth of inequitable conduct as a litigation strategy as a “ubiquitous weed”). 
31 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“[I]nequitable conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent family) unenforceable . . . .”). 
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inventor and the patent practitioner will likely be subject to deposition covering 
any relevant documents.32 This provides a unique window into the prosecution 
history and blurs the attorney-client privilege.33 A third advantage is that the 
asserting party can paint the inventor as deceitful, in contrast with the typical 
narrative of an opportunistic scientist.34  Thus, the accused infringer has an 
incentive to plead inequitable conduct at the slightest opportunity because the 
strategic and technical advantages are “too attractive to ignore.”35 
B. Inequitable Conduct as a “Plague” 
Inequitable conduct over-pleading was first characterized as a “plague” by the 
Federal Circuit in 1988.36 Since then, it has not disappeared and has in fact 
increased, leading some commentators to call for curtailment of Rule 56,37 
refinement of the duty of disclosure to include keywords for examiner searches,38 
and even the abolition of inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense.39 
Between 2000 and 2008, inequitable conduct pleadings at the district court 
level rose in a near-linear fashion from around four to forty percent. 40  
Conspicuously divergent from this trend is a relatively stable fraction of cases that 
actually uphold inequitable conduct claims at the Federal Circuit. This “ultimate 
success rate” hovers around 0.50% for the same period, though some factors are 
                     
32 Mammen, supra note 1, at 1332 (“[M]ost relevant documents will come from the files of 
the inventor and the patent attorney who prosecuted the patent, and those individuals will likely be 
subject to deposition.”). 
33 Id. (citing an “asymmetrical discovery burden”).   
34 Id. (stating that the accused infringer can “impugn the character of the inventor and her 
counsel, providing a counterbalance to the patentee's likely narrative at trial of the inventor as an 
idealized genius.”). 
35 John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based 
on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q. J. 7, 8 (1988). 
36 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit 
of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague. 
Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable lawyers on 
the slenderest grounds, to represent their client’s interests adequately, perhaps.”). 
37 See, e.g., Erstling, supra note 30, at 365 (“Short of abolishing the duty of candor altogether, 
an alternative would be to follow the model of the European Patent Office (“EPO”). Under such a 
system, no duty of disclosure would be imposed on an applicant unless an examiner determined 
that information was needed but the examiner was unable to access it herself.”). 
38 Giuseppe Scellato et al., Study on the quality of the patent system in Europe, PATQUAL, 
91–93 (Mar. 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/patqual02032011_en.pdf. 
39 Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective Elimination of the 
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716, 730 (2012). 
40 See Mammen, supra note 1, at 1358–60 (outlining a table and corresponding graphic 
illustrating trends in inequitable conduct pleading). 
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not considered. 41  These factors include the number of settled cases where 
inequitable conduct claims played a role in the decision to settle, cases that were 
not appealed, and cases where inequitable conduct was not addressed on appeal. 
Nonetheless, the steady increase of inequitable conduct pleadings supports the 
categorization of inequitable conduct over-pleading as a “plague.”42 
C. Congressional Motivations 
Supplemental examination blossomed from Senator Orrin Hatch’s advocacy 
to restrict the inequitable conduct doctrine due to its ever-increasing burden on 
patent litigation.43 
Discovery in any litigation is costly and inequitable conduct claims are no 
different. In 2011, the median cost to reach the end of discovery was one-and-a 
half-million dollars for a patent infringement case seeking one to twenty-five 
million dollars in damages.44 If a patent suit includes an inequitable conduct 
claim, this requires both sides to spend a substantial sum to explore these 
allegations, which only adds to the cost. 
The risk of defending inequitable conduct claims often deters investors, 
especially because an inequitable conduct finding could render a portion of the 
patent portfolio unenforceable, wiping out the entire investment.45 Congress 
included supplemental examination in the AIA to resolve such uncertainties with 
respect to patents.46 This should increase patent-driven innovation with all of the 
ensuing economic benefits.47 
In essence, Congress sought to provide an expedited procedure for a patent 
owner to eliminate uncertainty, at least with respect to potential flaws in patent 
prosecution.48 In theory, this would be useful to convince a skeptical investor by 
                     
41 Id. (illustrating trends in inequitable conduct success on appeal). 
42 Id. at 1360. 
43 Joe Matel, A Guide To The Legislative History Of The America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B. J. 539, 546 (2011) (“Senator Hatch continued to pursue inequitable-conduct reform, 
arguing that the defense has been overpleaded and ‘has become a drag on the litigation process.’” 
(citing 153 CONG. REC. S4691 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch))).  
44 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at I-153 
(2011) (Tbl. Q42c) (reporting industry statistics). 
45 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
46 See id.  
47  See id. (“[S]upplemental examination will result in path-breaking inventions being 
developed and brought to market that otherwise would have lingered on the shelf because of legal 
uncertainty . . . .”). 
48 Id. (“Currently, even minor and inadvertent errors in the patent application process can lead 
to expensive and very unpredictable and very inequitable conduct litigation.”). 
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“bulletproofing” a patent in view of an inconsistent position or prior art not 
presented to the USPTO.49 
III. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION RULES AND COMMENTS 
The new 35 U.S.C. § 257 provides the statutory basis for supplemental 
examination,50 and recently the USPTO issued final supplemental examination 
rules outlining the filing process.51 A supplemental examination request must 
comply with formal requirements, including joinder of all parties, a fee, up to 
twelve items of information, and any optional explanations. 52  During 
supplemental examination, the examiner will determine if the submitted 
information raises a SNQP or uncovers any material fraud.53  Upon conclusion, 
the USPTO will publish a supplemental examination certificate and may order ex 
parte reexamination if an SNQP arises.54 Interspersed within the discussion of 
these rules that follow in the next few sections are relevant public comments. 
A. Statutory Basis 
Supplemental examination under 35 U.S.C. § 257 became available to patent 
owners on September 16, 2012.55 Section 257(a) describes the supplemental 
examination request and places a three-month statutory deadline for the USPTO 
to issue a supplemental examination certificate, which indicates whether the 
information raises an SNQP.56 Section 257(b) states that ex parte reexamination is 
required if any item of information raises an SNQP.57 Under § 257(c), the patent 
cannot be held unenforceable in view of information considered during 
                     
49 Id. (“It is often the case that startup companies or university researchers cannot afford to 
hire the very best patent lawyers. . . . Later, when more legally sophisticated investors evaluate the 
patent for potential investment or purchase, these minor flaws in prosecution can deter the investor 
from purchasing or funding the development of the invention.”). 
50 See infra Part III.A. 
51 See infra Part III.B. 
52 See infra Part III.C. 
53 See infra Part III.D. 
54 See infra Part III.E. 
55 35 U.S.C.A § 257 (West 2012). 
56 See id. § 257(a) (West 2012) (“A patent owner may request supplemental examination of a 
patent in the Office to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the 
patent . . . . Within 3 months after the date a request for supplemental examination meeting the 
requirements of this section is received, the Director shall conduct the supplemental examination 
and shall conclude such examination by issuing a certificate indicating whether the information 
presented in the request raises a substantial new question of patentability.”) 
57 See id. § 257(b) (West 2012) (“If the certificate issued under subsection (a) indicates that a 
substantial new question of patentability is raised by 1 or more items of information in the request, 
the Director shall order reexamination of the patent.”). 
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supplemental examination. 58  This protection extends to the request itself. 59 
Exceptions exist where supplemental examination does not preempt a civil suit 
claim filed prior to the supplemental examination request.60 Similarly, the benefits 
of supplemental examination do not extend to patent enforcement actions until all 
proceedings are concluded.61 Next, § 257(d) gives the USPTO the authority to 
establish fees and regulations.62 Finally, if the Office learns of a material fraud, § 
257(e) directs the Director to refer the matter to the Attorney General.63 
B. Filing a Supplemental Examination Request 
1. Filing of Papers 
a. All Parties of Any Interest Must Join the Request 
A patent owner may request supplemental examination at any time during the 
period of enforceability of a patent.64 The USPTO deems any party with an 
ownership interest in a patent a “patent owner.”65 Since the result of supplemental 
                     
58 See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of 
conduct relating to information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was 
incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was considered, reconsidered, or 
corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent.”). 
59 See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“The making of a request under subsection (a), or the 
absence thereof, shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282 
[presumption of validity; defenses].”) 
60 See id. § 257(c)(2)(A) (West 2012) (“Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an allegation pled 
with particularity in a civil action . . . before the date of a supplemental examination request . . . 
.”). 
61 See id. § 257(c)(2)(B) (West 2012) (“[P]aragraph (1) shall not apply to any defense raised 
in [a patent enforcement] action . . . unless the supplemental examination, and any reexamination 
ordered pursuant to the request, are concluded before the date on which the action is brought.”). 
62 See id. § 257(d) (West 2012). 
63 See id. § 257(e) (West 2012) (“If the Director becomes aware . . . that a material fraud on 
the Office may have been committed in connection with the patent that is the subject of the 
supplemental examination . . . the Director shall . . . refer the matter to the Attorney General for 
such further action as the Attorney General may deem appropriate.”). 
64 Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 48,852 (Aug. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA], available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 
1.601(c)). 
65 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 301(IV) (8th ed., rev. 8, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] (“All parties 
having any portion of the ownership of the patent property must act together as a composite entity 
in patent matters before the Office.”). 
10
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examination is binding on the entire patent, all owners are required to join.66 Non-
patent owners (e.g., third parties) cannot participate in supplemental examination 
proceedings and are barred from filing any papers or other submissions related 
thereto.67 
b. Fees Due at Filing 
i. Rule 
Effective March 19, 2013, the request must include $16,500,68 covering both 
the cost of the supplemental examination and the potential ex parte reexamination 
filing fees: $4,400 and $12,100, respectively, with the latter fee being refunded if 
no SNQP is raised. 69 Recent legislation will reduce these fees for small and micro 
entities,70 potentially because of the widespread public response. 
ii. Commentary 
A number of public comments expressed some form of sticker shock. This is 
understandable because the cost of pre-AIA ex parte reexamination was just 
$2,520.71 The USPTO appears to justify this fee increase to “encourage applicants 
to provide all relevant information during initial examination, which facilitates 
compact prosecution.”72 Yet this logic is faulty because the motivation behind 
supplemental examination was to provide an avenue to avoid spending resources 
in litigation debating inequitable conduct claims.73 
                     
66 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,832 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)) (“A request for supplemental examination of a patent must be filed by the 
owner(s) of the entire right, title, and interest in the patent.”). 
67 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(b)). 
68 Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 4,212, 4,232 (Jan. 18, 2013), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-18/pdf/2013-00819.pdf (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.20(k)(1–2)) (displaying Table 19 that shows a twenty-two percent fee reduction 
from initial projections). 
69 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,851 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)). 
70 Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4,232 (displaying Table 19 
that shows a sixty-one and eighty-one percent fee reduction for small and micro entities, 
respectively). 
71 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1) (2010). 
72  Executive Summary: Patent Fee Proposal, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 
USPTO, (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting_-
_ppac_hearing_executive_summary_7feb12.pdf. 
73 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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A discrepancy arises when a patent owner seeks to submit fewer than twelve 
items yet pays the flat rate for up to twelve items.74 This illustrates the disparity 
between the fee calculation and the actual cost of administering supplemental 
examination. This is unfortunate because “Congress has provided a new avenue to 
remove inequitable conduct issues, but the PTO immediately sets fees to deter the 
use of the procedure.”75 
c. Filing Date Awarded upon Perfection of Request  
Upon perfection of the supplemental examination request, a filing date will be 
awarded, though a patent owner will be given time to submit missing parts to an 
incomplete request.76 At that time, the three-month statutory clock begins, during 
which the USPTO must complete the supplemental examination. 77  The 
supplemental examination request will be available in the public Patent 
Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system only after the request is 
perfected78 in order to avoid a “race to the court.”79 
C. Content of Request 
1. Request Limited to Twelve Items of Information 
a. Rule 
A supplemental examination request is limited to twelve items of information, 
although more than twelve items can be presented by filing multiple requests.80 
An item is broadly defined as anything relevant to patentability, including patents, 
                     
74 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830, 48,842 (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a)); see also Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final Rule, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 4,248. 
75 Letter from Richard F. Phillips, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, to David J. 
Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., Dir. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at 
3 (Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with USPTO), available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/pdfs/IPOcomments.pdf (commenting on proposed fees).  
76 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,852 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.610(d)). 
77 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(a) (West 20012) (“Within 3 months after the date a request for 
supplemental examination meeting the requirements of this section is received, the Director shall 
conduct the supplemental examination and shall conclude such examination by issuing a 
certificate . . . .”). 
78 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830 (“The Office, 
however, is establishing a procedure in which the request, and any other papers or information 
submitted as part of or accompanying the request, will not be available in Public PAIR until the 
request meets the conditions to be entitled to a filing date.”). 
79 Id. at 48,842 (USPTO response to comment 23). 
80 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a)). 
12
Cybaris®, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol4/iss1/4
[4:157 2013]      Supplemental Examination and Inequitable Conduct:                 
Protection and Pitfalls 
 
169 
printed publications, audio or video recordings, and evidence of a prior sale.81 The 
Office “reserves its option to merge supplemental examination proceedings as 
circumstances arise.”82   
b. Commentary 
Although the Office received suggestions to use a sliding scale,83 it chose a 
flat fee to comply with the statutorily mandated three-month reply period.84 The 
Office provided additional justification for the twelve-item limit, reporting that 
ninety-three percent of ex parte reexamination requests in 2011 included twelve 
items or fewer.85 This is unfortunate for patent owners wishing to submit more 
than twelve items because the thirteenth item doubles the cost, but due to 
economies of scale, almost certainly does not double the burden. This situation 
provides a windfall to the Office. 
Submissions with more than twelve items may be commonplace if 
supplemental examination is used to “cleanse” a patent portfolio prior to 
acquisition, especially if patents in the portfolio were not prosecuted with 
sophisticated counsel.86  This is especially relevant considering that a single 
successful inequitable conduct charge can tarnish an entire patent family.87 
Another commentator noted that during discovery, “literally dozens of 
potential inequitable conduct allegations are pursued, particularly during 
discovery, in hopes of finding a subset of such issues to pursue and present at 
                     
81 See id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(b)); see also id. at 48,833 (discussion 
of Rule 1.605(b)). 
82 See id. at 48,839 (USPTO response to comment 9 regarding merger). 
83 Letter from Robert A. Armitage, Section Chairperson, Am. Bar Ass’n Section of 
Intellectual Prop. Law, to David J. Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., Dir. 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at 2 (Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with USPTO), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_a-aba_20120323.pdf (“1. The Hard 
[12-item] Limit for Items of Information Cited in a Request for Supplemental Examination Should 
be Replaced by a Sliding Fee Scale for Additional Items of Information.”). 
84 David Kappos, The Role of Submission Limits in Timely Completion of Supplemental 
Examination, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/the_role_of_submission_limits (describing the conflict 
between providing a quick (three-month period) yet decisive examination of overlooked items and 
the inevitable complexity that too many items invites).  
85 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830. 
86 Letter from William G. Barber, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, to David J. 
Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., Dir. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at 
2 n.4 (Mar. 26, 2012) (on file with USPTO), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_a-aipla_20120326.pdf (speculating on 
potential uses of supplemental examination and the importance of sophisticated counsel). 
87 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (“[I]nequitable conduct 
renders an entire patent (or even a patent family) unenforceable . . . .”). 
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trial.”88 Thus, although fewer than twelve items may be presented in court, many 
more are likely to be alleged pre-trial. This runs counter to the USPTO rationale 
that “inequitable conduct . . . during patent litigation . . . typically concern[s] far 
fewer than twelve items of information.”89 
One irony is that Congress enacted the three-month limit to expedite the 
supplemental examination process. Yet there is no time limit on any subsequent 
ex parte reexamination proceedings. Thus, for any supplemental examinations 
that proceed to ex parte reexamination, the three-month turnaround may be of 
minor importance compared to the uncertain duration of reexamination. 
2. Other Content Requirements 
In addition to including the items of information relevant to patentability, 
multiple other content requirements exist.90 Notably, the request must identify the 
patent claims for which supplemental examination is requested and include a 
“separate, detailed explanation of the relevance and manner of applying each item 
of information to each claim of the patent for which supplemental examination is 
requested.”91 This is important because it implies that the patent owner may limit 
the scope of supplemental examination to specific claims as opposed to the patent 
as a whole. Furthermore, the patent owner can frame any relevant issues in 
favorable light, or guide the examiner away from sensitive issues, as discussed in 
section V below. 
3. Request May Include Additional Explanations  
Although not required, the patent owner may submit additional explanations 
to the examiner.92 This may assist the examiner in focusing on the relevant issues, 
though it may also raise potential problems if the patent owner steers the 
examiner away from difficult or problematic aspects of the reference. Again, this 
is discussed in section V below. 
D. Supplemental Examination Proceedings 
                     
88 Letter from Robert A Armitage, supra note 83, at 2 n.1 (commenting on placing a limitation 
on the number of items).  
89 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830. 
90 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)) (listing nine separate requirements to 
the supplemental examination request). 
91 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)(4)–(5)). 
92 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c)(3)–(4)) (stating that the owner may 
include “[a]n explanation of how the claims patentably distinguish over the items of information” 
and “[a]n explanation of why each item of information submitted with the request does or does not 
raise a substantial new question of patentability.”). 
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After a filing date is awarded, the Office has three months to determine if an 
SNQP exists.93 The Office will examine the information provided in view of the 
applicable claims, however, the precise scope of the proceedings is ambiguous.94 
The Office will also search for any indications of material fraud. 
1. Scope of Proceedings 
“Within three months after the filing date of a request for supplemental 
examination, the Office will determine whether a substantial new question of 
patentability affecting any claim of the patent is raised by any of the items of 
information presented in the request.”95 It is important to note how the “any-any” 
language encompasses any claim and any item. Yet the next sentence in the rule 
appears to limit this all inclusive language: “The determination will generally be 
limited to a review of the item(s) of information identified in the request as 
applied to the identified claim(s) of the patent.”96 This potential mismatch in 
scope is discussed in Part V below. 
Although a SNQP is never defined in a statute, the MPEP states that “[a] prior 
art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability 
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider 
the prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the 
claim is patentable.”97 There is no reason to believe this definition would not 
apply to information submitted during a supplemental examination. 
2. Material Fraud 
If the Office uncovers any fraud, the matter will be referred to the U.S. 
Attorney General in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 257(e), though the Office 
anticipates that such instances will be rare.98 Although not incorporated into § 
1.620, the Office defined “material fraud” as narrower in scope than the 
inequitable conduct in Therasense.99 
3. Other Limitations 
                     
93 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(a) (West 2012). 
94 See infra Part V.A.1. 
95 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,852 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.620(a)) (emphasis added). 
96 Id. (emphasis added). 
97 MPEP, supra note 65, § 2242(I) (although a SNQP will not be found if the “same question 
of patentability has already been decided as to the claim in a final holding of invalidity by the 
Federal court system or by the Office in a previous examination.”) A common example is 
cumulative prior art already considered. Id. 
98 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,853 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.620(g)) (providing guidance for how the USPTO should handle fraud). 
99 Id. at 48,829; see also infra Part IV (discussing material fraud in view of Therasense). 
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The rules provide no options for communicating with the Office outside of the 
supplemental examination request. For example, substantive interviews with the 
examiner are prohibited,100 and amendments cannot be filed.101 
E. Conclusion from the Supplemental Examination Analysis 
By the end of the three-month statutory period, the Office will issue a 
supplemental examination certificate indicating whether a SNQP exists.102 
1. If a SNQP Exists 
If the Office finds a SNQP in light of one or more items of information, the 
examiner will order ex parte reexamination in accordance with § 257(b).103 
Although the ensuing ex parte reexamination is limited to items included in the 
supplemental examination request, any claim in the patent may be examined.104 
Interestingly, although the ex parte reexamination must address each SNQP 
identified during supplemental examination,105 the rules give the examiner the 
freedom to raise new SNQPs and consider items of information that did not 
previously raise a SNQP.106 The supplemental examination certificate will only 
indicate that a SNQP was raised, and an ex parte reexamination certificate will 
publish when the matter concludes.107 
2. If no SNQP Exists 
If the Office finds that no SNQP exists, the electronic supplemental 
examination certificate will issue, ex parte reexamination will not be ordered, and 
the fee will be refunded.108 The supplemental examination certificate will indicate 
that no SNQP was raised by any of the items of information considered.109 
                     
100 Id. at 48,853 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(e)). 
101 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(f)). 
102 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(a)–(c)). 
103 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(b)). 
104 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(d)(2)) (“Reexamination of any claim of the patent 
may be conducted on the basis of any item of information as set forth in § 1.605.” (emphasis 
added)). 
105 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West 2012) (“[T]he Director shall address each substantial new 
question of patentability identified during the supplemental examination . . . .”). 
106 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,853 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.625(d)(2–3)) (“(2) Reexamination of any claim of the patent may be conducted on 
the basis of any item of information; . . . (3) Issues in addition to those raised by patents and 
printed publications . . . may be considered and resolved . . . .”). 
107 See id. at 48,853 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(b)). 
108 See id. at 48,853 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(c)) (stating that if there is no SNQP, 
then the reexamination fee is refunded in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)). 
109 Id. (stating that the certificate will indicate whether any item considered raised a SNQP). 
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Regardless of whether a SNQP arises, supplemental examination, by itself, is 
enough to grant the patent immunity with respect to the items considered.110 Thus, 
unless an exception applies,111 the patent cannot be held unenforceable in view of 
the information considered during supplemental examination. 
Nonetheless, there is some risk during every supplemental examination that 
the Office may determine that the new information presents evidence of material 
fraud. While finalizing the AIA, Senator Kyl recommended that the standard for 
judging material fraud should be in line with Therasense,112 persuading the Office 
to use this standard as the lower boundary for material fraud.  Of course, this 
standard is subject to judicial interpretation. 
IV. MATERIAL FRAUD IN VIEW OF THERASENSE  
Although supplemental examination is supposed to shield a patent owner from 
inequitable conduct claims, the Office could actually uncover material fraud 
during supplemental examination. The Office refers to inequitable conduct in 
Therasense to define the lower boundary of material fraud.113 The Therasense 
court shifted inequitable conduct jurisprudence towards a stricter standard.114 The 
interplay between supplemental examination and Therasense is likely to be 
minimal because the standard requires egregious deception, the applicant controls 
which documents are reviewed, and third party submissions are excluded.115 
A. Defining Material Fraud and Inequitable Conduct 
The Office states that “material fraud” is narrower than inequitable conduct as 
defined in Therasense.116 Inequitable conduct requires two elements: (1) intent to 
deceive and (2) materiality of the reference with respect to patentability.117 Under 
                     
110 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that a patent shall not be held unenforceable 
if the information was considered during supplemental examination). 
111 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(2) (West 2012) (providing exceptions for prior allegations and 
present patent enforcement actions). 
112 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). (suggesting that 
the Director should use the standard in Therasense to determine whether a fraud is “material”). 
113 See infra Part IV.A. 
114 See infra Part IV.B. 
115 See infra Part IV.C. 
116 Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 
48,829 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA], available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
117 See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“To successfully prove inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must present ‘evidence 
that the applicant (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose 
material information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the 
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the current Rule 56, information is material to patentability if it establishes, by 
itself or in combination, a prima facie case of unpatentability, or is inconsistent 
with an applicant’s assertion to the Office.118 
Prior to Therasense, these two elements were weighed on a “sliding scale,” 
where a patent could be held unenforceable by a strong showing of materiality 
and a minimal showing of intent, and vice versa.119 The Therasense court 
narrowed this definition by requiring both elements and setting higher thresholds 
for each. 
B. Federal Circuit Ruling in Therasense 
1. Background 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., involves disposable blood 
glucose strips used to help diabetics measure the glucose levels in their blood.120 
An electrochemical reaction on the strip generates an electrical current 
corresponding to the glucose concentration. 121 Therasense (now Abbott 
Laboratories (Abbott)), owns U.S. Patents 5,820,551 (‘551) and 4,545,382 
(‘382).122 The alleged novelty of the ’551 patent was that the reaction occurred 
without an intervening membrane, whereas the ’382 patent required a 
membrane.123 
As pointed out by the examiner, the ’382 patent specification disclosed that a 
protective membrane was optional, yet not required: “Optionally, but preferably 
when being used on live blood, a protective membrane surrounds both the enzyme 
and the mediator layers, permeable to water and glucose molecules.”124 
In order to overcome this reference, the examiner required a qualified 
scientist’s declaration swearing that one skilled in the art would read this 
description as requiring a membrane.125 Abbott did exactly this, asserting that the 
                                                      
[PTO].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cargill, Inc v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2007))). 
118 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2010). 
119 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“Thus, for example, where an objective “but-for” inquiry is satisfied . . . a lesser showing of facts 
from which intent can be inferred may be sufficient to justify holding the patent invalid or 
unenforceable, in whole or in part.”). 
120 649 F.3d 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1283. 
123 Id. 
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“optionally, but preferably” language was mere “patent phraseology.”126 The 
examiner allowed the patent and on the day of issuance Abbott asserted it against 
a competitor in an infringement action.127 Unfortunately for Abbott, this language 
was inconsistent with a prior assertion in a sibling case prosecuted at the 
European Patent Office (EPO). 
2. EPO Prosecution 
The ’382 patent application’s European counterpart issued as European Patent 
0,078,636 (’636). During prosecution, Abbott made assertions that were exactly 
opposite to the assertions made at the USPTO. For example, with respect to the 
same “optionally, but preferably” language: “It is submitted that this disclosure is 
unequivocally clear. The protective membrane is optional, however, it is 
preferred when used on live blood in order to prevent the larger constituents of 
the blood, in particular erythrocytes from interfering with the electrode sensor.”128  
The Applicant never submitted the EPO assertion to the USPTO. The USPTO 
examiner only allowed the contested patent after an affidavit was filed in which 
an expert asserted a specific interpretation of the prior art. Becton pled inequitable 
conduct on the grounds that this interpretation was inconsistent with 
representations in the application prosecuted before the EPO. 
3. Narrower Inequitable Conduct Standard in Therasense 
In one fell swoop, the Therasense court shifted inequitable conduct 
jurisprudence towards a stricter standard. The decision pivoted on how much 
weight to give the assertions made to the EPO, which were withheld from the 
USPTO and inconsistent with an affidavit filed with the USPTO just prior to 
issuance. 
The en banc panel affirmed that inequitable conduct requires intent to deceive 
and materiality of the reference, but went further, holding that omitted 
information is only material if “but-for” its exclusion the claim or patent would 
not have issued.129 Similarly, the court affirmed that the standard for intent to 
                     
126 Id. 
127 Abbott Labs. v. Lifescan, Inc., 37 F.Supp.2d 70 (D. Mass. Oct 1999). 
128 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1284 (referring to J.A. 6585) (emphasis added). 
129 Id. at 1291 (“When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art is but-
for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior 
art.”). But see id. at 1292 (“This court recognizes an exception in cases of affirmative egregious 
misconduct. . . . [For example,] ‘deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme[s]’ to defraud 
the PTO and the courts.” (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 
245 (1944))). 
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deceive also requires a threshold level of “clear and convincing” evidence.130 The 
court went even further, holding that both elements must exceed the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, as compared to the previously applied lower 
standard of a preponderance of the evidence, and that they should not be weighed 
on a sliding scale.131 A claim rejection is a USPTO judgment subject to review by 
the courts. “But-for” materiality means that the omitted information renders the 
claim invalid because the USPTO would not have allowed the claim if it had been 
aware of the reference. This case-within-a-case invalidity is indeed far more 
difficult to prove. 
The court vacated and remanded the Therasense case with respect to the 
inequitable conduct claims.132 With respect to materiality, the district court was 
charged with determining whether the USPTO “would not have granted the patent 
but for Abbott’s failure to disclose the EPO briefs.”133 With respect to intent to 
deceive, the district court was charged with determining whether the practitioners 
knew of the briefs and their materiality and “made the conscious decision not to 
disclose them in order to deceive the PTO.”134 
4. District Court Findings upon Remand 
In March 2012, the district court applied this new stricter standard and 
nonetheless found Abbott’s ’551 patent unenforceable due to inequitable 
conduct.135 Citing the same evidence as above, the court found that the USPTO 
would not have allowed the patent if it had been made aware of the EPO brief.136 
The court also found that Abbott knew that the withheld assertion was 
material and that the attorneys in question intentionally withheld this assertion 
because it would seriously undermine the patentability of the invention.137 The 
court found that the intent to deceive was especially strong in light of the 
infringement suit filed the same day as issuance.138 
                     
130 Id. at 1290 (stating that the accused infringer must prove that the patent owner acted with 
the specific intent to deceive the PTO (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
131 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“A district court should not use a ‘sliding scale,’ where a 
weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality, and vice 
versa.”). 
132 Id. at 1296. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 856, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
136 See id. at 868. 
137 Id. at 865. 
138 Id. at 868. 
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Today, the disputed patent is unenforceable,139 as the appeal was dismissed 
and attorney fees awarded.140 This provides an important example of what 
constitutes inequitable conduct under the Federal Circuit’s stricter standard, since 
it was applied to the very facts upon which the new standard was based. 
Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear how an examiner would apply the Federal 
Circuit’s Therasense inequitable conduct standard to material fraud during 
supplemental examination. 
C. Interplay Between Supplemental Examination and Therasense 
Dictum in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Therasense appears to predict a 
reduction in inequitable conduct pleadings following the implementation of a 
stricter standard.141 Although it may be too soon to assess the accuracy of this 
prediction, supplemental examination provides an additional route for patent 
owners to bypass these claims. Since the Therasense standard is the minimum 
threshold for material fraud in supplemental examination, the holding has 
additional impact beyond the courts. Supplemental examination should allow 
patent owners to cleanse a patent from innocent oversights while still detecting 
fraud. Yet given the statutory protection granted to the supplemental examination 
request, the applicant’s control over the scope of examination, the Therasense 
standard, and the exclusion of third parties, the Office will rarely uncover material 
fraud. If material fraud is suspected, errors of commission will likely be treated 
harsher than errors of omission. 
1. The USPTO Could Uncover Material Fraud During Ex Parte 
Reexamination 
During supplemental examination, a patent owner is limited to submitting a 
request, which “shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent.”142 During the 
actual examination, statements, interviews, and amendments are not allowed.143 
Thus, a patent owner’s actions are limited to the submission request which “shall 
                     
139 Id. at 869. 
140 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. C 04–02123 WHA, 2012 WL 1877895, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2012). 
141 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“To address these concerns [of over-pleading inequitable conduct and over-disclosure of 
marginally relevant prior art], this court adjusts . . . the standard for materiality.”). 
142 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012).  
143 Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 
48,853 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA], available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. §§ 
1.620(c), (e), (f)). 
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not be relevant to enforceability,” essentially a form of statutory immunity.144 
Nonetheless, the Office must contemplate some situation where the supplemental 
examination itself would uncover material fraud because it provided the 
Therasense standard. Since the supplemental examination request has statutory 
immunity, an ex parte reexamination ordered after supplemental examination 
could reveal evidence of material fraud, though this is unlikely. 
The request itself contains only information selected by the patent owner, 
giving the applicant complete control over what information is reviewed.145 If the 
prosecuting attorney is filing the supplemental examination request, he or she is 
unlikely to volunteer information that could be considered material fraud since 
this would put both the patent and the attorney’s license at risk. But patent 
practitioners might think twice about “airing their dirty laundry.”146 
Furthermore, if the patent owner changes representation and the new attorney 
suspects material fraud during the prosecution, the attorney will likely advise 
against supplemental examination since the patent could be declared invalid 
during the ex parte reexamination.147 This disincentive to submit particularly 
harmful information is aided by the exclusion of third parties148 whom may have 
the most to gain from invalidating the patent. Thus, if the Office uncovers 
material fraud, it will most likely be from a small subset of unsuspecting 
practitioners or those with a high-risk tolerance. If this does happen, Therasense 
provides a concrete example of the minimum level of conduct that could lead to 
material fraud in practice. 
2. Potential Examples of Material Fraud 
a. Errors of Commission 
                     
144 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012). 
145 See id. § 257(a) (West 2012). 
146  Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Supplemental Examination: Airing Your Dirty Laundry?, 
PHARMAPATENTS (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2012/02/01/supplemental-
examination-airing-your-dirty-laundry/#page=1 (“The new Supplemental Examination provisions 
have been described as a mechanism by which patent holders can ‘launder’ information that might 
otherwise render their patents unenforceable. Perhaps the price of being able to launder 
information to avoid inequitable conduct charges is having to air your dirty laundry in public.”). 
147 See Roger Shang & Yar Chaikovsky, Inter Partes Reexamination of Patents: An Empirical 
Evaluation, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) (stating that, while lower than inter partes 
reexamination, there is still a 10% invalidly rate for ex parte reexamination). 
148 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,845 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.601(b)).  
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An error of commission is a mistake where an actor does something wrong, as 
opposed to an error of omission where inaction is the mistake.149 Errors of 
commission can arise during patent prosecution when an applicant asserts 
knowingly false or inconsistent statements or arguments, for example, when an 
applicant refutes an examiner’s argument or makes an argument of 
patentability.150 Failing to disclose the relevant information can breach the Rule 
56 duty of disclosure.151 For example, the losing party in Therasense breached 
this duty because the EPO brief was inconsistent with the USPTO affidavit.152 
Although this withholding could be viewed as an error of omission because the 
brief was not disclosed to the USPTO, it is more likely to be considered a false 
statement or an error of commission because the affidavit directly contradicted the 
EPO brief. 
The USPTO and the courts treat errors of commission harsher than errors of 
omission because the applicant had to take affirmative steps to make the error.153 
Furthermore, it is easier to prove that an applicant had intent to deceive if there 
are affirmative actions or statements, as opposed to inaction or silence. With 
respect to supplemental examination and any subsequent reexamination, the 
                     
149  Error of commission, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/error-of-commission (last visited May 
23, 2013) (“[A] mistake that consists of doing something wrong . . .”); Error of omission, 
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-
english/error-of-omission?q=error+of+omission (last visited May 23, 2013) (“[A] mistake that 
consists of not doing something you should have done . . .”).  
150 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2)(i)–(ii) (2010) (“[I]nformation is material to patentability when it . . . 
is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability 
relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.”). 
151 Id. § 1.56(a) (“The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is 
deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued 
in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office . . . .”). 
152 Id. § 1.56(b)(2)(i). 
153 Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. AluminArt Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (Linn, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court's three inequitable conduct cases involved overt 
fraud, not equivocal acts of omission.” (citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint. 
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 809, 819 (1945))); see also Erstling, supra note 30, at 337–38 (“The 
seminal 1945 [Supreme Court] case of Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. . . . involved 
perjury and fraud in an interference proceeding. During the proceeding’s discovery phase, the 
patentee learned that the opponent had lied by submitting false affidavits about the dates of 
conception and disclosure of the invention as well as about inventorship. Rather than reporting the 
fraud, the patentee settled the interference and received rights to both the patents in question. 
When the patentee attempted to enforce the patents in a subsequent infringement action, the 
district court refused to do so, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, arguing that not only the 
doctrine of unclean hands, but also the public interest, precluded the enforcement of ‘perjury-
tainted patents.’” (footnotes omitted) (citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816)). 
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USPTO is more likely to find material fraud if it uncovers an error of 
commission. 
b. Errors of Omission 
During international patent prosecution, foreign offices often cite references 
not cited by the USPTO. Practitioners will typically file an information disclosure 
statement (IDS) with the Office to provide this reference to the examiner for 
consideration in the prosecution of the U.S. patent.154 This can create a complex 
web of references, especially when prosecuting multiple patents in multiple 
jurisdictions and different languages. Supplemental examination can likely 
remedy an inadvertent omission, especially if the reference is similar to references 
previously raised by the USPTO.155 
If the Therasense court instead considered a common error of omission, it is 
difficult to see how the court would have found intent to deceive. For example, if 
a reference was cited during the EPO prosecution and that reference was never 
submitted to the USPTO, it would be difficult to prove that Abbott had specific 
intent to deceive, especially under the clear and convincing evidence standard. 
Thus, this error of omission would most likely be viewed in a more favorable 
light. 
Nonetheless, problems may arise, particularly if the reference was used to bar 
patent rights in a foreign jurisdiction or significantly narrow the claims compared 
to the U.S. counterpart. A savvy litigator could plant seeds of doubt that the patent 
practitioner intentionally withheld the reference. 
Based on the strict standard in Therasense, the Office is unlikely to uncover 
material fraud during supplemental examination. This is because the request has 
statutory immunity, the patent owner selects what information is considered, third 
parties are excluded, and the standard requires particularly egregious conduct. 
This is illustrated by the historical preference to find inequitable conduct in acts 
of commission compared with acts of omission. Since filing a supplemental 
examination request is by definition an act (as opposed to an omission), questions 
invariably arise regarding whether supplemental examination could create new 
grounds for inequitable conduct. The answer is an uncomfortable maybe. 
                     
154 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2010) (“Any information disclosure statement . . . shall include . . . (1) A 
list of all patents, publications, applications, or other information submitted for consideration by 
the Office.”). 
155 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that if the information raises no SNQP, 
the patent cannot be held unenforceable). 
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V. SCOPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION VS. SCOPE OF IMMUNITY: COULD A 
PATENTEE REMAIN VULNERABLE TO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT CLAIMS AFTER 
SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION? 
Academic and public commentary illuminated potential mismatches between 
the scope of immunity and the scope of the supplemental examination.156 This 
may manifest in at least three fact patterns. First, assuming blanket immunity, a 
disreputable patent owner may try to mislead the examiner by limiting the scope 
of the identified issues, steering the examination away from sensitive subject 
matter.157 Second, if a court limits immunity to the scope of examination, a patent 
owner that does not fully recognize all possibilities may present a limited case, 
opening the door to, albeit narrower, inequitable conduct claims.158 Third, a 
position taken during supplemental examination, if contrary to prior assertions, 
may create fodder for future inequitable conduct claims.159 
A. Immunity Awarded to Undeserving Patent due to Mischaracterization by a 
Mistaken or Disreputable Applicant 
Many comments, and at least two law review articles,160 pointed out a 
potential loophole in the law where, whether by mistake or unethical behavior, an 
undeserving patent may obtain “amnesty” from inequitable conduct claims. This 
possibility is rooted in the potential disconnect between the scope of the 
examination and the scope of rights awarded by supplemental examination. 
1. Scope of Supplemental Examination 
At first glance, the scope of the supplemental examination is identical to the 
scope of rights awarded because the examination explores all information 
                     
156 See generally White, supra note 39.  
157 See infra Part V.A.1–2. 
158 See infra Part V.A.4. 
159 See infra Part V.B. 
160 Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) 
(describing supplemental examination as a patent amnesty program, “encourag[ing] patent 
applicants to use any number of strategies that would never have been countenanced under pre-
AIA law to obtain patents, and it offers to cure all but the most extreme through filing a 
supplemental examination request.”); see also Jason Rantanen et al., America Invents, More or 
Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 231 (2012) (“Another change that carries the 
potential to reduce patent-encouraged innovation is the AIA's supplemental examination 
provision, which immunizes patents from charges that applicants deceived the Patent Office into 
allowing patents that do not satisfy the requirements for patentability.” (citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 257 
(West 2012)). 
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presented, and the immunity applies to the entire patent with respect to that 
information.161 
The statute compels the Director to indicate whether the “information 
presented in the request raises a substantial new question of patentability.”162 
There is no reason to believe that “information” should be interpreted differently 
from the Rule 56 duty of disclosure in patent cases, which requires that patent 
owners disclose information material to any claim.163 Material information is 
somewhat circularly defined as anything “material to patentability.” 164  This 
includes patents and printed publications but also prior public uses, sales, offers to 
sell, and prior invention by another. Thus, in theory, all “information” is 
considered when determining if a SNQP exists. In practice though, the rules allow 
a patent owner to mislead the examiner, whether intentionally or accidentally. The 
rules require that the supplemental examination request contain “[a] separate, 
detailed explanation of the relevance and manner of applying each item of 
information to each claim of the patent for which supplemental examination is 
requested.”165 
Thus, supplemental examination may not examine all claims in a patent. The 
option to limit which claims are examined is reiterated: “The determination will 
generally be limited to a review of the item(s) of information identified in the 
request as applied to the identified claim(s) of the patent.”166 
Optionally, a patent owner may attempt to frame the issues by including “an 
explanation of how the claims patentably distinguish over the items of 
information”167 or an “explanation of why each item of information submitted 
with the request does or does not raise a substantial new question of 
patentability.”168 The Office most likely implemented these mechanisms in order 
to reduce the burden on the examiners by forcing the patent owner to focus on the 
relevant issues and pertinent claims. Yet this can introduce significant bias. 
                     
161 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(a), (c) (West 2012) (stating that “information” is examined with respect 
to a “patent” and the “patent” cannot be held unenforceable based on that “information”).  
162 Id. § 257(a) (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
163 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010). 
164 MPEP, supra note 65, § 2001.04. 
165 Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 
48,852 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA] (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. § 1.620(b)(5)). 
166 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(a)) (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c)(3)). 
168 Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c)(4)). 
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Within these optional explanations, any relevant issues will most likely be 
framed in the light most favorable to the patent owner. Furthermore, by limiting 
the scope of the supplemental examination to the “claim[s] . . . requested,”169 the 
patent owner may sidestep the very questions of patentability that the information 
raises. This could create a brand new allegation of inequitable conduct. For 
example, the intentional misdirection of the examiner to avoid a valid SNQP 
could lay the grounds for future inequitable conduct claims even though the initial 
failure to submit the reference may not be inequitable. 
Assuming not every conceivable issue is presented and examined, 
supplemental examination is unlikely to explore every aspect of the presented 
information in view of all allowed claims. The mismatch in scope of examination 
is paired with a mismatch in the scope of immunity. 
2. Scope of Immunity 
The statute compels the courts to provide full immunity to inequitable conduct 
claims stemming from references submitted for supplemental examination: “A 
patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to 
information” if that information is considered during supplemental 
examination. 170  A plain reading of the statute implies that if an item of 
information is presented during supplemental examination a court has no choice 
but to dismiss all inequitable conduct claims “relating” to that information.171 This 
protection extends to the “patent” rather than just the patent claims scrutinized 
during supplemental examination. The clear statutory language provides minimal 
room to maneuver. 
This presents an opportunity for a disreputable practitioner to obtain 
“amnesty” from actual inequitable behavior.172 As outlined in one comment, the 
patent owner could limit the examination to patent owner-identified issues of 
patentability yet claim the full statutory protection.173 Thus, a patent owner could 
                     
169 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)(5)). 
170 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c) (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
171 Id. § 257(c) (West 2012) (“shall” indicates that the court must dismiss claims “relating to 
information . . . considered . . . during a supplemental examination”). 
172 Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 160, at 25. 
173 Letter from William P. Berridge, Oliff & Berridge, PLC, to Cynthia L. Nessler, U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office, Office of Patent Legal Admin., at 7 (Mar. 20, 2012) (on file with USPTO), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_d-oliff_20120320.pdf 
(“[T]he USPTO proposes to allow patent owners to determine the contours of supplemental 
information and limit the USPTO’s consideration of information to only patent owner-identified 
issues of patentability and claims, while providing those same patent owners with the full statutory 
exemption from inequitable conduct claims.”). 
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use supplemental examination as a shield such that the Office never addresses the 
actual issues of patentability.174 
3. USPTO Response 
The USPTO briefly addressed suggestions that supplemental examination 
should “entail a general reassessment of all issues of patentability” as opposed to 
only applicant-identified issues. 175  The Office asserted that supplemental 
examination will be “generally limited to a review of the item(s) of information 
identified in the request with respect to the identified claim(s) of the patent.”176 
By using the words “generally limited,” the Office reserves the right to broaden 
the scope of supplemental examination beyond the identified claims. Yet later in 
the response, the Office “put[s] the patent owner on notice that unless the patent 
owner identifies the particular claim(s) which the patent owner requests the Office 
to consider with respect to each item of information, the record may not reflect 
that these claim(s) were explicitly considered by the examiner.”177 
This appears to conflict with the broad statutory language that “information” 
considered during supplemental examination cannot be raised in an inequitable 
conduct claim. Nonetheless, citing the burden of completing an “accurate and 
comprehensive determination” within the three-month statutory window, the 
Office resolutely places the onus on the patent owner to call out all the claims 
related to any SNQP.178 The Office ends by noting that, contrary to the statutory 
language, the scope of immunity could be a judicial question “within the purview 
of the courts.”179 
4.  An Incomplete Supplemental Examination May Leave Patentees 
Vulnerable to Limited Inequitable Conduct Claims 
A court could limit the scope of inequitable conduct immunity to be 
commensurate with the scope of examination. This means that an item of 
information presented during supplemental examination could potentially be 
asserted in an inequitable conduct claim if it was not fully considered, for 
                     
174 Id. at 8 (“[T]he patent owner would have effectively used supplemental examination to 
protect itself against an allegation of inequitable conduct without the USPTO or the court actually 
analyzing relevant issues of patentability and relevant claims.”). 
175 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,843 (characterizing 
comment 25). 
176 Id. (referring to proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(a)) (emphasis added). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (“As to the level of unenforceability protection, the issue of whether a court would be 
statutorily required to dismiss all allegations of inequitable conduct involving a particular item of 
information is within the purview of the courts.”). 
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example, if some claims are not examined or are incompletely examined. This 
runs contrary to the statutory language barring inequitable conduct claims 
“bas[ed] on conduct relating to information” considered during supplemental 
examination.180 Furthermore, this undoing of statutory immunity would likely 
complicate the litigation, raising costs and the burden on courts. 
A judicial interpretation to allow inequitable conduct claims relating to 
information considered during supplemental examination would appear to 
undermine the statutory language. As noted above, a court “shall not” hold a 
patent unenforceable on grounds relating to information considered during 
supplemental examination.181 Thus, it is unlikely, but not inconceivable, that a 
court would limit the scope of immunity to anything less than the entire patent. If 
a court did indeed limit the immunity, it would most likely be commensurate with 
the scope of examination. Since the Office would have only examined the 
selected claims in view of the new information, it makes sense to extend statutory 
protection to the examined claims. 
Thus, a safe route for both patent owners and practitioners is to request 
examination of all claims. Additionally, keeping the characterization of the 
invention and prior art to a minimum should reduce any practitioner-introduced 
bias. By keeping the scope of supplemental examination as broad as possible, the 
patent owner should, in theory, be awarded with broad immunity. 
B. Supplemental Examination Could Create New Grounds for Inequitable 
Conduct Not Protected by Limited Immunity 
Though unlikely, a patent could receive only limited protection after 
supplemental examination. If so, one question is whether conduct relating to the 
supplemental examination could create new grounds for inequitable conduct. For 
example, the written explanation of the “relevance and manner” 182 in which the 
information relates to the claims could run contrary to a stance taken during 
prosecution.183 Furthermore, an unethical practitioner could avoid addressing the 
very SNQP that the information raises by limiting the scope to a less significant 
issue. Regardless of the nature, the statute appears to shield supplemental 
                     
180 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012). 
181 Id.  
182 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,852 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)(5)). 
183 Letter from Donika P. Pentcheva & Theodore M. Magee, Minn. Intellectual Prop. Law 
Ass’n, to Cynthia L. Nessler, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Office of Patent Legal Admin., at 3 
(Mar. 26, 2012) (on file with USPTO), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_a-mipla_20120326.pdf (the optional 
detailed explanation for each identified issue (and other explanations) are “unnecessary and places 
the Owner(s) in jeopardy of raising new inequitable conduct issues.”). 
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examinees from inequitable conduct claims relating to the supplemental 
examination request,184 though issues may arise during an ensuing reexamination. 
After submitting a supplemental examination request, the patent owner is 
effectively barred from communicating with the Office regarding substantive 
matters in the supplemental examination. Prohibited actions include conducting 
interviews 185  as well as submitting alternative claim language or proposed 
amendments.186 Even if ex parte reexamination is ordered after supplemental 
examination, the patent owner does not have the right to file a statement or 
proposed amendment.187 
Thus, outside of the initial supplemental examination request, there is little 
opportunity during supplemental examination for a patent owner to act 
inequitably. Yet, any number of issues could arise during the subsequent ex parte 
reexamination. “The Federal Circuit has held that the submission of information 
during reexamination . . . does not bar a subsequent inequitable conduct defense 
based on that information.”188 
Although the supplemental examination request is entitled to statutory 
immunity, § 257 grants no protection to the subsequent reexamination. 189 
Furthermore, any protection granted to the request is limited to inequitable 
conduct defenses under § 282.190 Thus, some conduct surrounding the request and 
any ex parte reexamination is still subject to Rule 56 sanctions. For example, if a 
practitioner attempts to avoid addressing a SNQP in a request by 
mischaracterizing a reference, the practitioner could be subject to Office 
disciplinary proceedings. 
Supplemental examination provides a shield that only deflects inequitable 
conduct attacks in a courtroom. As such, patent owners should be on guard when 
                     
184 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“The making of a [supplemental examination] 
request . . . shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282.”). 
185 Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,853 (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 1.620(e)). 
186 Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(f)); see also id. at 48,844 (stating in response to 
comment 30 that amendments could “create a cloud on the patent” if the Office determines that no 
SNQP exists). 
187 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West 2012). 
188 Robert Greene Sterne et al., America Invents Act: The 5 New Post-Issuance Procedures, 13 
SEDONA CONF. J. 27, 58 (2012) (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 
326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
189 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West 2012) (stating that if ex parte reexamination is ordered, the 
statute makes no mention of enforceability or lack thereof). 
190 Id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“The making of a request . . . shall not be relevant to 
enforceability of the patent under section 282.”). 
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submitting a supplemental examination request. The statutory immunity during 
litigation is unlikely to apply to other proceedings in the Office. Although a 
supplemental examination request is unlikely to generate fodder for future 
inequitable conduct claims, a patent practitioner may still become ensnared in 
other Office matters if not careful. 
VI. PROPOSED STATUTORY AND & REGULATORY CHANGES 
As presently enacted, supplemental examination is unlikely to significantly 
reduce the number of inequitable conduct claims pled during patent infringement 
suits. This is because the cost is high, the scope of examination and immunity are 
uncertain, and patent attorneys will be hesitant to inadvertently create fodder for 
future inequitable conduct claims. Congress should amend § 257 to improve 
access to supplemental examination and reduce these uncertainties, aligning the 
proceedings with the congressional intent. Revised statutory language is 
proposed191 and discussed192 below. 
A. Proposed Statutory Language 
Congress should append the italicized language after the last sentence of 35 
U.S.C. § 257(a): 
A patent owner may request supplemental examination of a patent in the 
Office to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be 
relevant to the patent, in accordance with such requirements as the 
Director may establish. Within 3 months after the date a request for 
supplemental examination meeting the requirements of this section is 
received, the Director shall conduct the supplemental examination and 
shall conclude such examination by issuing a certificate indicating 
whether the information presented in the request raises a substantial new 
question of patentability. The Director may extend the three-month 
deadline at the request of the Applicant. 
Congress should amend 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) to incorporate the following 
italicized language:  
A patent shall not be held unenforceable, with respect to a claim in 
the patent, on the basis of conduct relating to information that had 
not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was incorrect 
in a prior examination of the patent claim if the information was 
considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental 
examination of the patent claim.  The making of a request under 
                     
191 See infra Part VI.A. 
192 See infra Part VI.B–D. 
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subsection (a), or the absence thereof, shall not be relevant to 
enforceability of the patent under section 282 or 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. 
B. Applicant-Initiated Exception to the Three-Month Limit Allows a Simpler Fee 
Structure. 
The proposed amendment to § 257(a) enables an applicant to extend the three-
month statutory limit, providing the USPTO with an avenue to create a simpler 
fee structure. This would enable a sliding scale fee approach because the Office 
would not be under the time pressure when considering thirteen items or more. 
Additionally, the sliding scale could have a lower limit of one item, so that the 
remedial cost for a single flaw in prosecution is less than twelve flaws. Overall, 
this is a step towards making the fees commensurate with the burden on the 
Office. Importantly, the USPTO would have to amend 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.605193 and 
1.620194 accordingly for the statutory amendment to have an effect.  
C. Limit the Scope of Immunity to the Claims Examined 
The proposed amendments to § 257(c) regarding patent claims should clarify 
the scope of examination and immunity. The proposed amendment requires a 
claim to be considered during supplemental examination in order to qualify for 
statutory protection from inequitable conduct. This eliminates the loophole where 
a practitioner could direct the examiner to only one claim yet receive full statutory 
protection for the entire patent. 
Unfortunately, this still leaves open the possibility that a disreputable 
practitioner may try to steer the examiner away from a sensitive issue. This is an 
acceptable compromise because it is unreasonable to expect the examiner to 
consider every conceivable way that an item of information could apply to a given 
claim. If the examiner is directed to both the claim and item of information, the 
examiner will likely scrutinize the reference at least as closely, if not closer, as 
during an initial patent prosecution. This should greatly reduce the likelihood that 
a significant issue slips past the examiner. 
                     
193 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a) (2010) (proposed italicized language to be added after the first 
sentence: “Each request for supplemental examination may include no more than twelve items of 
information believed to be relevant to the patent. The Director may allow a supplemental 
examination request to include more than twelve items if the Applicant waives the three-month 
deadline for the Office to respond. More than one request for supplemental examination of the 
same patent may be filed at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent.”). 
194 Id. § 1.620(a) (proposed italicized language to be added after the first sentence: “Within 
three months after the filing date of a request for supplemental examination, the Office will 
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent is 
raised by any of the items of information presented in the request. The Director may extend the 
three-month deadline at the request of the Applicant. The determination . . . .”). 
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D. Extend the Protection Given to the Request to Rule 56 
The proposed amendment to § 257(c) extends the protection given to the 
supplemental examination request beyond inequitable conduct in court and to 
Rule 56 at the USPTO. Including Rule 56 immunity will eliminate the possibility 
that the request itself creates disciplinary grounds before the USPTO. If the Office 
believes that content in the request could be considered inequitable, 
reexamination can be ordered and any issues clarified. This is important because 
it will increase access to supplemental examination by reducing uncertainty. A 
patent practitioner will likely be hesitant to submit a supplemental examination 
request if it could lead to Rule 56 disciplinary proceedings. The proposed 
amendment aligns the interests of practitioners with the patent owner. 
These proposed statutory amendments close loopholes in the supplemental 
examination proceedings and increase access. As more patents undergo the 
scrutiny of supplemental examination, fewer patents will be eligible for 
inequitable conduct claims in lawsuits, furthering the intent of Congress. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Supplemental examination is a good start in the effort to stem the “plague” of 
inequitable conduct claims. As currently implemented, it is unlikely to be the 
panacea that Congress envisioned while drafting the AIA. Future amendments 
may increase access to the proceedings by making supplemental examination 
cheaper and reducing the risk that an honest practitioner inadvertently create 
evidence that could be used in future inequitable conduct claims. 
Supplemental examination requires a patent owner to part with a large sum of 
money to examine up to twelve items, though a large fraction may be refunded. 
This fixed-fee structure unlinks the fee from the burden of examination. The 
Office could implement a sliding scale if Congress allowed exceptions to the 
three-month statutory turnaround time, lowering fees and simplifying examination 
of large portfolios. 
The Office predicts scenarios where it may uncover material fraud during 
supplemental examination. To assist the examiners, the Office set the threshold 
for material fraud to be narrower than inequitable conduct in Therasense. 
Applicants’ actions will have to be especially egregious to exceed this strict 
standard. Given the limited interaction with the Office during supplemental 
examination, as well as statutory protection, the Office will rarely uncover 
material fraud. This will be reinforced by practitioners’ hesitancy to submit 
information that they know could be considered fraudulent. 
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The statutory language, especially in view of the USPTO rules, leaves room 
for judicial interpretation of whether the scope of supplemental examination 
matches the scope of protection from inequitable conduct proceedings. Depending 
on the statutory construction, at least three mechanisms exist where supplemental 
examination could give rise to inequitable conduct. First, a disreputable patent 
owner could mislead the examiner by steering the examination away from 
sensitive subject matter. Second, a patent owner that does not fully recognize all 
possibilities may present a limited case, opening the door to, albeit narrower, 
inequitable conduct claims. Third, a position taken during supplemental 
examination, if contrary to prior assertions, may create fodder for future 
inequitable conduct claims or Rule 56 violations. Statutory amendments could 
reduce the likelihood that these scenarios arise in practice. 
Supplemental examination will likely become a niche arena like many of the 
other post-issuance proceedings. In some cases, it is likely to reduce claims of 
inequitable conduct, though many practitioners may hesitate to risk an issued 
patent and their clean record by acknowledging supposed flaws in prosecution. 
Supplemental examination will most likely be a precursor to most infringement 
suits because of the lower cost compared to litigation discovery. Furthermore, it 
will likely be used to expunge errors by less sophisticated counsel if technology 
based on a patent is pending purchase or further investment. 
Though the future of supplemental examination is uncertain, these questions 
should resolve with time, and we will be able to better judge whether 
supplemental examination helped to reduce the “plague” of inequitable conduct 
pleadings. 
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